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Abstract
Governments are increasingly reliant on the reacquisition of water rights as a mechanism for
recovering overexploited basins. Yet, serious concerns have recently been raised about the efficacy
and operational dimensions of existing programs. Water buyback is typically implemented as the
purchase of a fixed quantity of water rights from the agricultural sector at the price set by the
Water Authority. This paper seeks to analyze whether the use of water buyback in its current form
represents a sensible means of recovering overexploited basins. The results – which are
particularly relevant to contexts characterised by poor enforcement regimes and widespread illegal
water use – highlight the need for greater scrutiny of current programs and call for additional work
to improve the design of reacquisition policies in the context of water resource management.
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1 Introduction
Over the last few decades, groundwater resources have become increasingly important
for agricultural development especially in countries characterized by arid and semi-arid
climates. According to United Nations (2003), agriculture accounts for approximately
70% of groundwater use worldwide and groundwater irrigation is responsible for over
90% of total water use in many arid and semi-arid regions.
The e¤ect of the large-scale expansion of groundwater irrigation has been twofold.
On the one hand, it has triggered signicant social and economic benets to many rural
areas (Moench 2003; World Bank 2005). On the other hand, an increasing number of
aquifers worldwide is now overexploited or under severe stress with adverse conse-
quences for both the environment and the long-run economic development of regions.
At the root of the problem in many countries lies the fact that groundwater develop-
ment has been carried out by individual farmers with little management and planning
on the part of governmental authorities (Llamas and Martinez-Santos 2005). In par-
ticular, the expansion of groundwater-based agriculture has not been accompanied by
a simultaneous evolution of the property rights regime. This has, in turn, resulted in
uncontrolled water abstractions and inequitable distribution of the resource (Meritxell
et al. 2004; Kemper 2007).
The case of the Upper Guadiana Basin, in the La Mancha region of central Spain,
is emblematic and will be used throughout this paper as an illustrative example. The
process of allocation of water rights started in the Guadiana at the end of the 1980s
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when groundwater use for agriculture was already widespread. In the initial phase
of this process, water rights were allocated on the basis of historical uses, with little
regard to the availability of groundwater resources and the long-run recharge capacity
of the aquifer. As a result, the Guadiana system is now largely overallocated, in that
the total volume of water that can be abstracted by entitlement holders exceeds the
sustainable level of abstraction for the system (Bromley et al. 2001; Llamas 2005).1
These problems are common to many other basins worldwide, fromMexico to Australia,
China, North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula (Melville and Broughton 2004; Kemper
2007; Nevill 2009).
Against this backdrop, policy-makers and researchers have come to acknowledge
that a revision of water rights regimes is an essential step for achieving the sustainable
management of water resources. Within this context, water buy-back schemes - i.e.,
the direct purchase of water rights by governmental authorities - have become an
increasingly popular approach. Yet serious concerns have recently been raised about
the e¢ cacy and operational dimensions of such schemes. According to recent studies,
for example, only a third of the water purchased under the Living Murray buy-back
program has actually made its way into the rivers as "real" water (Breckwoldt 2008;
Crase et al. 2009; Foerster 2011). Predictions of similar outcomes have been made
in the case of recently approaved buy-back initiatives in other settings, including the
Upper Guadiana basin (Blanco et al., 2007).
1According to recent estimates (CHG 2005), total legal rights over groundwater amount to about
600Mm3/yr. This contrasts with the aquifers estimated 300Mm3/yr renewable resources.
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This paper o¤ers a theoretical framework to analyze whether the use of water buy-
back in its current form represents a sensible means of achieving structural adjustments
in the water sector. The results provide theoretical support for some of the concerns
voiced about existing programs, and shed light on the incentive mechanisms through
which these programs operate. In particular, the analysis suggests that the design
and implementation features of current programs may disregard the complexities of
many real-world situations, and the interaction with other water policy initiatives,
thus potentially leading to perverse e¤ects.
The predictions of the model should not be taken to imply that water buy-back has
no role as a means of recovering overexploited basins. Rather, the paper highlights the
need for greater scrutinity of current programs and urgently calls for additional work
to improve the design of water buy-back.
The paper is organized a follows: Section 2.1 provides a brief overview of the
nature and workings of water buy-back schemes, while 2.2 discusses the associated
challenges of illegal water use. Section 3 introduces the theoretical framework for
analysing water buy-back schemes. The e¤ectiveness of such schemes and key issues
associated with their implementation and interaction with enforcement policies are
considered in sections 4 and 5, respectively. The paper concludes in section 6 with a
discussion of the key ndings and the wider implications of the model.
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2 Water buy-back schemes in context
2.1 Applications and rationale
Initially demonized as the policy of last resort, the direct purchase of water rights by
governments is now being proposed in numerous basins as a means of "putting water
back into rivers" (Thoyer 2006; Wong 2008). The Special Plan for the Upper Guadiana
basin - approaved in January 2008 - allocates more than 800 Million Euros to the
implementation of a buy-back program within the basin (CHG 2008). In Idaho, USA,
the National Water Resources Board has recently decided to engage in an important
operation of re-acquisition of water entitlements from the Eastern Snake River Plain
Aquifer. The re-purchase of water access rights has also been a central feature of the
National Plan for Water Security of the Murray-Darling Basin, released in January
2007 (Freeman 2005; Crase et al. 2009). Similar policies have been considered in
Cyprus, Morocco, and various regions of Mexico (Kemper 2000; Ansink and Marchiori
2009).
The idea behind the buy-back approach, as it has been proposed in real-world con-
texts, is to induce a certain reduction in water consumption by purchasing an equivalent
amount of water rights from water-intensive sectors - in particular agriculture - and
re-allocating this to the environment. Re-acquisition is typically dened on the basis
of a xed-quantum of water rights. For example, in the Upper Guadiana basin, the
Water Authority has agreed to buy-back a total of 144 Mm3 of water rights (GHC
2008). Following current empirical examples, in this paper we model water buy-back
5
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as the acquisition of a xed quantity of water entitlements from irrigators at a price
set by the Water Authority.
As previously mentioned, notwithstanding the increasing enthusiasm for water buy-
back, there are many reservations about the e¢ cacy and operational dimensions of
current programs. In the Guadiana context, motivated by the observed ine¢ cacies
of the enforcement regime, serious concerns have been raised by local environmental
groups about the environmental outcomes that the proposed operation of reacquisi-
tion of water rights might deliver. These concerns are supported by recent simulation
studies, predicting that a buy-back approach would induce only marginal reductions in
water consumption in farms where legal and illegal wells coexist (Blanco et al., 2007;
Martinez-Santos et al., 2008; Varela-Ortega, 2007).
This, in turn, suggests that any meaningful analysis of the e¢ cacy of water buy-
back needs to explicitly take into account the interaction between buy-back programs
and enforcement policies. Indeed, as the economics and policy literature indicates, en-
forcement plays an important role in dening the success of any rights-based approach
(Baldwin and Cave, 1999). Within the context of the present analysis, enforcement
becomes even more crucial given the coexistence of overallocation and intensive illegal
water use observed in many river basins worldwide.
2.2 Illegal water use
Illegal water userefers to uses of water that fall outside the limits established by the
law. These include wells and surface water intakes that are exploited without previously
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applying for authorization from the River Basin Authority, as well as situations in which
licenced holders abstract greater volumes of water than they are entitled to. The data
available on illegal water use are generally fragmented and incomplete, and they are
normally based on estimates. This is a rst indication of how di¢ cult it is for water
authorities to tackle such problems.
Yet, recent studies indicate that illegal water use is common to many basins around
the world and has intensied in recent years (UN 2003; Kemper 2000). The widespread
use of illegal water is certainly a key feature of the Upper Guadiana basin. O¢ cial
sources estimate that nearly 50% of existing wells in the region are unlicensed. In
addition to that, most of the water withdrawn from authorized wells is not metered.
Inadequate monitoring and enforcement have been recognised as an important factor
underlying illegal water use in the basin (Garrido et al., 2006). In response to this sit-
uation, the Guadiana Water Authority has proposed a series of policy measures aimed
at enhancing the stringency and e¤ectiveness of the enforcement regime. Particular
emphasis has been given to increasing the ne rates for illegal water usage, and im-
proving monitoring through the expansion of remote sensing and the installation and
control of water meters (Llamas 2005; CHG 2008; Carmona et al. 2011).
The current status of the enforcement regime, as well as policy measures to address
its shortcomings, have potentially important implications for the e¤ectiveness of buy-
back schemes and the costs associated with their implementation. Yet these aspects
are often neglected in practice by designing such policies in isolation (Blanco et al.,
2007).
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In this paper, we seek to analyse the suitability and performance of reaquisition
programs in context- that is, by taking explicitly into account the e¤ectiveness of the
enforcement regime under which such programs operate; the relationship between legal
and illegal water use; and the impact that policies aiming at improving the e¢ cacy of
the enforcement regime may have on the price of water rights.
The analysis shows that although the purchase of a xed amount of water rights
induces a reduction in water consumption, such reduction is always smaller than the
amount of water rights purchased back at a given price. This is due to the fact that
farmers tend to respond to the policy by increasing their use of illegal water.2 From
a policy perspective, this result suggests that there is a tendency to publicly overstate
the magnitude of water buy-back and that governments need to guard against the
risk of paying a premium for solutionsto over-allocation that later require additional
interventions. These conclusions seem in line with what Crase et al (2009) observe in
the context of the Murray-Darling Basin and o¤er theoretical support for some of the
concerns raised about the buy-back operation proposed in the Upper Guadiana.
The model also predicts that while investments in monitoring and enforcement
might enhance the e¤ectiveness of buy-back programs, they may also have perverse
e¤ects on the price of water rights, thus increasing the costs of implementing water
2This tendency has been observed in some istances within the context of the Murray-Darling basin
where irrigators have been encouraged to construct winter llstorage which can then be accessed
in summer to o¤set the limitations on extraction resulting from the sell of water rights (Crase et al.
2009)
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buy-back.
3 Denitions and assumptions
Consider a generic farmer with an initial endowment of water rights
_
w > 0, and assume
the very simple production function: q = wF , where q is crop output and wF is
the amount of water used for farming. Crop output is sold at the market price p.
Production costs are denoted by C
 
wF

and satisfy the following conditions:
(A.I ) C 0
 
wF

> 0; C 00(wF ) > 0; lim
wF!0
C 0
 
wF

= 0; lim
wF!1
C 0
 
wF

=1
Assumption (AI) guarantees that the function

pwF   C  wF  always admits an in-
terior optimum.
If the amount of water used for farming is higher than the initial endowment of
water rights, then a farmer is using some water illegally. Let wIL  wF   _w denote
illegal water consumption. If caught using water illegally, a farmer has to pay a ne
F , which is dened as follows:
F 'G, with G =
8>><>>:
0 ; if wIL  0
g(wIL) ; if wIL > 0
In the above denition, ' represents the ne rate, while the function g(wIL) governs
how quickly the per unit ne increases with total violation. It is assumed that g(wIL)
satises the following properties:
(AII ) g0(wIL) > 0; g00(wIL) > 0; lim
wIL!0
g0
 
wIL

= 0
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(AII) implies that the punishment increases more than proportionally with respect to
illegal water use. Moreover, if a farmer uses a very small amount of illegal water, the
punishment will be insignicant.3
Finally, let  be the probability of being caught. Then, a farmers expected cost
of using water illegally is:   '  G. To ease notation, let     ', so that the
expected cost of using illegal water can be written as: G. The coe¢ cient  can be
interpreted as a measure of the enforcement severity.4
4 Optimal water consumption in the status quo
Let b denote farmers payo¤ in the status quo; that is, before the introduction of any
buy-back scheme. Then, the following optimization problem can be dened:
(1) max
wF
b = pwF   C(wF )  G(wIL)
To derive the rst order conditions for problem (1), the following two cases must
be considered: (I)
_
w  w, and (II) _w < w, where w  argmax
wF
[pwF  C(wF )]. The
quantity w can be interpreted as the solution to problem (1) when the cost of using
illegal water is zero. Note that, under (AI), w is always strictly positive.
If the farmers initial endowment of water rights is large enough so that her payo¤
is maximized without using any illegal water - case (I) - then she will set her water
3This assumption seems to reect fairly well the structure of the ne system in the Guadiana
region, as well as in many other basins worldwide (see, for example, Stratton et al. 2008).
4In the remainder of the paper, we will talk about increasing (decreasing) the enforcement severity
without specifying whether we are increasing (decreasing)  or '.
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consumption equal to w. Consider now the second case; that is:
_
w < w. Due
to lim
wIL!0
g0
 
wIL

= 0 in (AII), there always exists an incentive to use some illegal
water. Therefore, farmers optimal water consumption will be given by the following
rst order condition:
(2) p  C 0(wF ) = g0wF (wIL)) bwF
Equation (2) simply states that, at the optimum, the net marginal return [p  
C 0(wF )]must equate the expected marginal cost of farming with illegal water g0wF (w
IL).
As an example, let us assume that: C
 
wF

= c  wF  2 with c > 0, and g(wIL) =
wF   _w2. Under this specication, w = argmax
wF
[pwF   c  (wF )2] = p=2c and
farmers optimal water consumption in the status quo is given by:
(3) bwF =
8>><>>:
p+2
_
w
2(c+)
; if
_
w < p
2c
p
2c
; if
_
w  p
2c
For
_
w < p=2c, the optimal water consumption exceeds the initial endowment of
water rights; that is, a farmer optimally chooses to use some water illegally. This
case is highly representative of the current situation in many overexploited basins,
which are often a¤ected by serious problems of illegal water use (UN 2003; Kemper
2000). In the Guadiana, for example, despite the fact that a large amount of rights
has been allocated, the vast majority of authorized properties are characterized by the
coexistence of legal and illegal wells (CHG 2007; Garrido et al. 2006). The widespread
use of illegal water can be explained by the high rates of return of groundwater-based
agriculture, the intrinsic di¢ culties of monitoring groundwater resources, and poor
11
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enforcement regimes. In the remainder of the paper, we will thus focus on the case in
which the status quo water consumption exceeds the initial endowment of water rights;
that is, some water is used illegally.5
5 Introduction of a water rights buy-back scheme
In this section, we analyze how the introduction of a buy-back scheme a¤ects farmers
optimal decisions. In the new set-up, the representative farmer is given the opportunity
to sell some of her rights to the Water Authority at a price pw set by the Authority.
Farmers payo¤ is given by:
 = pwF   C  wF + pwwS   G(wIL)
where wS is the amount of water rights sold at the given price pw, and wIL = wF  
_
w + wS:
Farmers optimization problem can be written as:
(4) max
wF ;wS
 = pwF   C  wF + pwwS   G(wIL), s:t: 0  wS  _w
The inequality constraint in (4) simply states that a farmer cannot sell an amount of
water rights higher than her legal endowment.
Appendix A.1 shows that G(wIL) can be simplied as g(wIL). The Lagrangian for
5It can be easily shown that the main results of the paper do not crucially depend on this particular
assumption and that the incentive-mechanism created by the introduction of a buy-back policy is still
in place when w  w:
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problem (4) can therefore be dened as:
L = pwF   C(wF ) + pwwS   g(wIL)  1  (wS   w) + 2wS
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are:
(a1) L0wF = 0 ) p  C 0(wF )  g0wF (wIL) = 0
(a2) L0wS = 0 ) pw   g0wS(wIL)  1 + 2 = 0
(b1) 1  0; wS  
_
w  0; with complementary slackness
(b2) 2  0; wS  0; with complementary slackness
We refer to appendix A.2 for a formal description of the procedure used to solve
the above system of rst-order conditions. The solutions to (4) are summarized below:
(5)
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
for pw  k )
8>><>>:
p  C 0(wF ) = g0wF (wIL)
wS = 0
5(a)
5(b)
for pw 2 (k; k))
8>><>>:
p  C 0(wF ) = g0wF (wIL)
pw = g
0
wS(w
IL)
5(c)
5(d)
for pw  k )
8>><>>:
p  C 0(wF ) = g0wF (wIL)
wS = w
5(e)
5(f)
where, k = g
0
wS(w
IL) jwS=0 and k = g0wS(wIL) jwS=w .
If the Authority sets pw  k, the farmer will not nd protable to sell any positive
amount of water rights. Therefore, k is the minimum value for pw above which a
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buy-back scheme can e¤ectively take place. Notice that, k can be interpreted as the
expected marginal cost of using illegal water at wS = 0; for a given wF . To clarify
the intuition behind threshold k; let us consider the trade-o¤ that a farmer faces when
deciding whether or not to sell some of her water rights. For simplicity, let us imagine
that the farmer wishes to sell one unit of legal water. By doing so, she will have to
increase her illegal water consumption by one in order to keep the amount of water
used for farming constant. Increasing illegal water use, in turn, implies that she will
incur in a higher expected punishment. Therefore, the farmer will sell some of her
water rights only if the price pw o¤ered by the Authority is su¢ ciently high so as to
compensate the increase in the expected cost of using illegal water (threshold k). If
pw = k, a farmers optimal response will be to sell all her rights. For pw > k, the farmer
would like to sell even more water but she hits the constraint in (4). Notice that, for
pw  k, the optimal conditions in (5) do not depend on pw. Consequently, the optimal
amount of water used for farming is independent of pw. The reason is simple: if at
pw = k a farmer is already selling all her water rights, then any further increase in the
price will simply increase farmers payo¤, but will not a¤ect her water consumption.
Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the farmers optimal water use for
intermediate values of pw.6
6In order to keep the picture simple, we have assumed that both the net benets from farming
[pwF   C(wF )], and the expected ne g(wIL) are quadratic, so that their slopes are linear. This is
the case, for example, when C
 
wF

= c
 
wF

2 and g(wIL) =
 
wIL
2
, as in the example previously
introduced.
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Figure 1: Farmer’s optimal conditions for intermediate values of pw
wIL
wF w wT
wS
w
pw
p
wS = w
The blue line in gure 1 represents the net marginal benet of water used in farming
(i.e. the left hand side of Eq. 5(c)). The green line represents the expected marginal
ne. Since the marginal ne is the same whether additional water is used for farming
or sold, this line represents the right hand side of both 5(c) and 5(d).The slope of this
curve depends on the coe¢ cient , which is a measure of the enforcement severity. The
red line identies the price pw set by the Water Authority (i.e., the left hand side of
5(d)). The point wT represents the sum of water consumed for farming (wF ) and water
sold (wS). We refer to this point as the total amount used. The aggregate marginal
benet of water usedis thus given by the kinked, dashed black line, which incorporates
both constraints. When the water price is below the net marginal benet of farming
at the extreme left of the gure, water is used for farming and not sold. When the
water price exceeds the net marginal benet of farming, water is sold until the water
15
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right constraint is hit. Once the farmer has sold the maximum amount of water she
is legally entitled to sell, her aggregate net benet is parallel to the net benet from
farming, but shifted to the right by an amount equal to the water sales. The point
wT (and consequently the quantities wF and wS) is determined by the intersection of
this aggregate marginal benet curve with the expected marginal ne. In Figure 1,
this intersection occurs at a point where the farmer sells some water, but not all that
she is legally entitled to sell. In other words, it illustrates an equilibrium of the type
embodied in Eqs. 5(c) and 5(d).
Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of thresholds k and k. The lower bound
(k) occurs at the intersection of the net marginal benet of farming and the expected
marginal ne. A price below this threshold is not su¢ cient to induce the farmer to sell
any water because the return from farming is higher. The upper bound (k) occurs at
the point where the water price is just high enough to induce the farmer to sell all her
water. This gure implies the existence of three types of equilibria, as in equation (5).
16
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Figure 2: A graphic representation of thresholds k and k
w w
k
k
The results derived in this section will be used below to analyze the environmental
e¤ectiveness of water buy-back.
6 Environmental e¤ectiveness of water buy-back
As previously mentioned, water buy-back is typically designed as the purchase of a
xed quantity of water rights from the Agricultural sector at the price set by the Water
Authority. For any given price, the environmental e¤ectivenessof current programs is
measured in terms of the amount of water rights acquired at that price. This is clearly
stated, for example, in the latest version of the Special Plan for the Upper Guadiana
(CHG 2008, Part V, page 4).
This section shows that, for any initial degree of severity of the enforcement regime,
17
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the purchase of an amount x of water rights always induces a reduction in water
consumption smaller than x. This, in turn, suggests that the declarede¤ectiveness
of water buy-back in its current form tends to overestimate its actual e¤ectiveness.
To illustrate this result, let us assume that the Water Authority wishes to purchase
an amount of water rights x, with x 2 (0; _w). This implies that the price of water pw
must lie within the interval
 
k; k

. More precisely, from (5) we have that a farmer will
sell an amount of water rights wS = x if and only if the following conditions hold:8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
p  C 0(wF ) = g0wF (wIL)
pw = g
0
wS(w
IL)
with wIL = wF   w + wS , and wS = x
The derivatives of g with respect to wF and wS can be written more explicitly as:
g
0
wF (w
IL) = @g=@wIL  @wIL=@wF
g
0
wS(w
IL) = @g=@wIL  @wIL=@wS
From the denition of wIL, it follows that: @wIL=@wF = @wIL=@wS = 1. Thus,
farmers rst-order conditions can be restated as:
(6)
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
p  C 0(wF ) = g0(wIL)
pw = g0(wIL)
with wIL = wF   w + x
Using the above conditions we will now prove that for any given  > 0 the following
lemma holds:
Lemma 1 dx
dpw
> 0, dw
F
dpw
< 0, and

dx
dpw
+ dw
F
dpw

> 0.
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Proof. By contradiction.
By di¤erentiating the equations in (6) with respect to pw we have:
(I) 0 = C
00
(wF )dw
F
dpw
+ g
00
(wIL)

dwF
dpw
+ dx
dpw

(II) 1 = g
00
(wIL)

dwF
dpw
+ dx
dpw

(i) Suppose dw
F
dpw
+ dx
dpw
= 0. Then, conditions (I) and (II) are trivially contradicted.
(ii) Suppose dw
F
dpw
+ dx
dpw
< 0. Then (II) would lead to g
00
(wIL) < 0, which contradicts
assumption (AII).
(iii) Suppose dw
F
dpw
+ dx
dpw
> 0 and dw
F
dpw
> 0. Given assumptions (AI) and (AII), this
implies: C
00
(wF )dw
F
dpw
+ g
00
(wIL)

dwF
dpw
+ dx
dpw

> 0, which in turn contradicts (II).
(iv) Hence, it must be that dw
F
dpw
+ dx
dpw
> 0 and dw
F
dpw
< 0; which, bearing in mind
that wIL = wF   w + x, implies: 0 < dwIL
dpw
< dx
dpw
.
The implications of the above discussion are summarized in proposition 1.
Proposition 1 For any given  > 0, the reduction in water consumption that can be
achieved at a given price is always smaller than the amount of water rights purchased
back at that price.
The intuition behind proposition 1 is simple. When a farmer is given the chance to
sell some of her water rights, the opportunity cost of farming with legal water relative
to illegal increases. As a consequence, a farmer will tend to use more water illegally.
This partially erodes the e¤ect of the buy-back policy on total water consumption.
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7 Implementation and enforcement: key interac-
tions
As previously mentioned, many basins in the world are not only over-allocated, but
also a¤ected by serious problems of illegal water use (UN 2003; Kemper 2000). This is
particularly important in the light of the incentive mechanism identied in the previous
section.
One way of addressing illegal water consumption is to enhance the e¢ cacy of the
enforcement regime through increasing the ne rates for illegal water usage and invest-
ing in monitoring measures such as the installation and control of water meters or the
expansion of remote sensing.
Of particular interest here is the potential impact that such policies may have on
the implementation and performance of water buy-back when this is designed as the
purchase of a xed quantum of water rights.
In the context of the present model, the degree of severity of the enforcement regime
is represented by the parameter . As  increases, the expected cost of using water
illegally increases. As a consequence, a farmer will try to reduce her consumption of
illegal water (wIL). There are two channels through which a farmer can reduce wIL:
(i) pumping less   that is, reducing the amount of water used in farming (wF );
(ii) substituting illegal for legal water   by selling less water rights.
It can be shown that, for a given pw 2  k; k, an increase in  such that pw is still a
feasible price, has no e¤ect on water consumption. In other words, a farmer responds to
20
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an increase in  by adopting the second channel only; that is, by perfectly substituting
illegal water for legal without varying the amount of water used for farming.
From (6), farmers rst-order conditions can be expressed as follows:
(7)
(I
00
) p  C 0(wF ) = pw ) wF
(II
00
) pw = g0(wIL)) wIL
Consider equation (II
00
) in (7). For a given pw, as  increases g0(wIL) must decrease
in order to restore the equilibrium. Since g0() is an increasing function of wIL, then
as  increases wIL must decrease. Assume that, in order to reduce her illegal water
consumption, a farmer decides to cut down the total amount of water used for farming,
wF . If wF decreases, the marginal cost of pumping C
0
(wF ) will decrease. Condition
(I
00
) says that, if C
0
(wF ) decreases, then the net return from farming is higher than the
return from selling water rights (since pw is constant). This implies that for any wF <
wF , a farmer will nd it protable to pump more water. From (I
00
), in equilibrium:
@wF=@ = 0. As previously discussed, assumption AII and equation (II
00
) imply
that: @wIL=@ < 0. Combining these results with the denition of wIL, we have:
@wIL=@ = @wS=@. Therefore, for a given pw 2 (k; k), if the degree of enforcement
increases, farmers response will be to perfectly substitute illegal for legal water by
selling less water rights. Thus, the optimal amount of water used in farming will remain
unchanged. Figure 3 provides a graphic illustration for this result. As rho increases,
the expected marginal ne line becomes steeper and wT falls. At the same time,
wF remains constant because the amount of water sold adjusts to keep the expected
marginal ne equal to the water price.
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Figure 3: Substitution of illegal for legal water
wF w w
pw
p
wT
From the above discussion it follows that:
Proposition 2 Given  > 0, the higher  (that is, the more stringent the enforcement
regime), the higher the price required to secure the purchase of a given quantum of water
rights.
Figure 4 provides a graphic illustration of proposition 2.
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Figure 4: A graphic illustration of proposition 2
w w
w
x
pw
p
As before, x refers to the volume of water rights that the Water Authority wishes
to purchase. For the amount of water sold to be equal to x, the intersection between
farmers aggregate water benet curve and the marginal ne must lie a constant hori-
zontal distance x from the marginal farming benet curve. In gure 4, this implies that
the intersection must lie on the black line with round dots. The gure shows that, as
the enforcement severity increases from the lighter to darker green lines, the necessary
price also rises from the lighter to darker red lines.
8 Conclusions
Governments are increasingly reliant on the reacquisition of water rights as a mech-
anism for recovering over-exploited basins. Yet, serious concerns have recently been
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raised about the e¢ cacy and operational dimensions of current buy-back programs.
Water buy-back is typically being implemented as the purchase of a xed quantity of
water rights from the agricultural sector at the price set by the Water Authority. This
relatively simple goal belies the complexities of many real-world situations, where over-
allocation problems tend to coexist with poor enforcement regimes and the widespread
use of illegal water. Our analysis showed that, due to these complexities, the current
approach to water buy-back may not be the most sensible one. More precisely, the
model proposed in this paper predicts that the purchase of a xed quantum of water
rights always induces a reduction in water consumption smaller than the amount of
rights purchased back at a given price. The intuition for this is that when farmers are
given the chance to sell some of their water rights, the opportunity cost of farming
with legal water relative to illegal increases. Consequently, farmers tend to optimally
increase their use of illegal water. This result provides theoretical support for some
of the concerns raised about existing programs, and highlights the need for greater
scrutiny since there is a strong tendency to publicly overstate the magnitude of buy-
back while securing water purchases that amount to limited environmental gains.
The second part of the analysis showed that the di¤erence between the acquired
volume of rights and the actual reduction in water consumption is smaller the more
stringent the enforcement regime. At the same time, the higher the degree of severity
of the enforcement regime, the higher the price required to secure the purchase of a
given quantum of rights. This result is especially important when a basin is not only
over-allocated but also a¤ected by problems of illegal water use and poor enforcement
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regimes  as it is the case in many real-world situations. In such contexts, water
buy-back will not be capable of making any genuine progress towards reduction in
water consumption without enhancing enforcement capacity. However, investments in
monitoring and enforcement may have perverse e¤ects on the price of water rights. In
other words, more public funds will be required to secure a given quantum of rights
where buy-back is accompanied by investments in enforcement capacity.
To avoid these perverse e¤ects, re-acquisition and enforcement policies must be
coupled, with consideration for how they interact. This has not been the case in the
Upper Guadiana basin, where policy interventions have largely overlooked the complex
relationship between legal and illegal water use. The tendency to develop buy-back
programs in isolation has been observed also in other settings, and in relation to other
policies. In the Murray Darling Basin, for example, water buy-back has been introduced
without much consideration for its potential interaction with the sustainable diversion
limit (SDL) established under the Commonwealth Water Act 2007. As shown by
Horne et al. (2011), however, the interaction between these two measures may have
signicant implications for their implementation and e¤ectiveness, again reinforcing
the importance of considering water buy-back in context. In the light of our ndings,
Horne et al. (2011)s conclusion is even more relevant when transparency in property
rights is not guaranteed due, for instance, to ine¢ cacies of the enforcement regime.
Pairing the purchase of water entitlements with other relevant policies is a chal-
lenging task, which may require a revision of current programs in terms of design,
goal specication and implementation strategies. Designing water buy-back as the
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purchase of a xed-quantum of water rights at a price set by the water authority does
not seem very sensible in the light of the incentive mechanisms identied in this paper
and the complex relationship with other policies.7 The formation of a more consistent
and e¤ective approach to water resource exploitation would benet from a governance
framework that sets the overarching policy goal in terms of water-use rather than
water-rights reduction targets, and exibly uses the purchase of water entitlements
and the increase of ne rates or the installation of water meters as complementary
tools of adjustment.
From an implementation perspective, one way to couple reacquisition and enforce-
ment policies may be by linking farmersparticipation to the buy-back program with
an agreement to install water meters and accept higher nes. This approach would im-
ply devolving partial decision-making responsability to local stakeholders. In a recent
study, Marchiori et al. (2012) showed that an additional benet of this approach is that
it might be able to better take account of equity issues associated with the distribution
and reallocaton of water rights. Equity considerations are particularly important in
light of the fact that in many real-world settings water resource expansion has essen-
tially followed the rule of capture; that is, the current allocation of water rights is
the result of the order of arrival of sectors or users rather than long term planning
on the part of governmental authorities (Ansink and Marchiori, 2009). In this paper,
we focused exclusively on issues related to cost-e¢ ciency and e¤ectiveness of buy-back
7In a di¤erent setting, Dixon et al. (2011) similarly point to the potential problems of dening
buy-back schemes on the basis of a xed quantity of water rights.
26
This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Water Resources Management. 
The final authenticated version is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11269-012-0047-8
schemes. An interesting extension for future research would be to explicitely model
distributional aspects.
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Appendices
A.1 Farmers optimal consumption of illegal water
This appendix shows that, when the initial endowment of water rights, w, is smaller
than w  argmax
wF
[pwF  C(wF )], it is never optimal for a farmer to set her consump-
tion of illegal water at wIL  0.
To prove this, let us study farmers optimization problem under the case wIL  0.
From (4), this can be written as:
max
wF ;wS
 = pwF   C  wF + pwwS
s:t: 0  wS  _w
The Lagrange function for the above problem is:
L = pwF   C(wF ) + pwwS   1  (wS   w) + 2wS
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are:
(a1) L0wF = 0 ) p  C 0(wF ) = 0
(a2) L0wS = 0 ) pw   1 + 2 = 0
(b1) 1  0; wS  
_
w  0; and 1  (wS  
_
w) = 0
(b2) 2  0; wS  0; and 2  wS = 0
Looking for the active constraint, the following four cases can be identied:
(I) wS   _w = 0, and wS = 0; which implies: _w = 0. This, however, cannot be since
by denition the farmer is endowed with a strictly positive amount of water rights,
that is:
_
w > 0.
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(II) wS   _w = 0, and wS > 0. Under this case, and from the denition of wIL =
wF   w + wS, we have: wIL = wF . Since we are considering the hypothesis wIL  0,
the previous equality implies: wF  0. This violates condition (a1).
(III) wS   _w < 0, and wS = 0. The complementary slackness condition implies:
1 = 0: Consequently, (a2) becomes: pw =  2. From (b2), we have: 2  0. Since
water price cannot be negative, it must be: pw = 0. This corresponds to the status quo
case when the farmer does not use any positive amount of illegal water. However, due
to assumption AII, this case does not represent an optimal solution when w < w.
(IV) wS   _w < 0, and wS > 0, so that: 1 = 2 = 0 . From (a2), we have: pw = 0.
However, if the price o¤ered by the Water Authority is zero, a farmer will not sell any
positive amount of water rights. Therefore, it cannot be wS > 0.
From the above analysis, we can conclude that, when w < w there is no solution
to problem (4) such that at the optimum wIL  0.
A.2 Resolution of farmers optimization problem un-
der a buy-back scheme
Appendix A.1 showed that, under a buy-back policy and for w < w, it is never optimal
for a farmer to set her consumption of illegal water at wIL  0. This allows us to write
G(wIL) = g(wIL) and to dene the Lagrangian for farmers optimization problem as:
L = pwF   C(wF ) + pwwS   g(wIL)  1  (wS   w) + 2wS
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The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are:
(a1) L0wF = 0 ) p  C 0(wF )  g0wF (wIL) = 0
(a2) L0wS = 0 ) pw   g0wS(wIL)  1 + 2 = 0
(b1) 1  0; wS  
_
w  0; and 1  (wS  
_
w) = 0
(b2) 2  0; wS  0; and 2  wS = 0
Conditions 1 (wS  
_
w) = 0 and 2wS = 0 in (b1) and (b2) yield the following
four cases:
(I) wS   _w = 0, and wS = 0. This case can, in fact, be disregarded because it
implies
_
w = 0, while a farmers initial endowment of water rights is, by denition,
strictly positive.
(II) wS   _w = 0, and wS > 0, so that 2 = 0. Condition (a2) becomes as follows:
pw   g0wS(wIL
wS = w ) = 1
Therefore, for 1 to be greater than or equal to zero as (b1) requires, it must be:
pw  g0wS(wIL
wS = w )
Under this condition, the system admits the following solution:8>><>>:
p  C 0(wF ) = g0wF (wIL)
wS = w
(III) wS   _w < 0, and wS = 0, so that 1 = 0. In this case, condition (a2) is as
follows:
pw   g0wS(wIL
wS = 0) =  2
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Therefore, 2  0 if and only if the following holds:
pw  g0wS(wIL
wS = 0)
Under the above condition on pw, the whole system is satised and the solution to
farmers optimization problem is:8>><>>:
p  C 0(wF ) = g0wF (wIL)
wS = 0
(IV) Finally, wS   _w < 0, and wS > 0, so that 1 = 2 = 0. From (a1) and (a2),
we have that the solution to the problem is dened by the following conditions:8>><>>:
p  C 0(wF ) = g0wF (wIL)
pw = g
0
wS(w
IL)
It can be easily observed that the above results correspond to the solution summa-
rized in (5).
31
This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Water Resources Management. 
The final authenticated version is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11269-012-0047-8
References
[1] Ansink, E. and Marchiori, C. (2009). Reallocating Water: An Application of Sequential
Sharing Rules to Cyprus, FEEM Working Paper No. 126.09.
[2] Baldwin, R., and M. Cave (1999), Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and
Practice, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[3] Blanco, I., Varela-Ortega, C., and Flichman, G. (2007). Cost-e¤ectiveness of Water
Policy Options for Sustainable Groundwater Management: a Case study in Spain,
CAIWA International Conference on Adaptive & Integrated Water Management. Coping
with Complexity and Uncertainty, Switzerland, 12-15 November 2007.
[4] Breckwoldt, R. (2008). Review of the 2007-2008 Water entitlement purchases: Final
Report. Melbourne: Hyder Consulting.
[5] Bromely, J., Cruces, J., Acreman, M., Martinez, L., and Llamas, M. R. (2001). Problems
of Sustainable Groundwater Management in an Area of Over-exploitation: The Upper
Guadiana Catchment, Central Spain, Water Resources Development, 17: 379-396.
[6] Carmona, G., Varela-Ortega, C., and Bromley, J. (2011), The Use of Participatory
Object-Oriented Bayesian Networks and Agro-Economic Models for Groundwater Man-
agement in Spain, Water Resources Management, 25:15091524.
[7] Chan, C., Laplagne, P., and Apples, D. (2003). The Role of Auctions in Allocating
Public Resources, Productivity Commission Sta¤ Research Paper. Productivity Com-
mission, Melbourne, Australia.
32
This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Water Resources Management. 
The final authenticated version is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11269-012-0047-8
[8] CHG (2005). Trabajos sobre los Articulos 5 y 6 de la Directiva Marco del Agua de la
Union Europea en la Cuenca del Guadiana y en los Ambitos Complementarios de los
Rios Tinto, Odiel y Piedras. Ministerio de Medio Ambiente. Guadiana CHG. Available
online at: http://www.chguadiana.es/publica/index.htm (October, 2005).
[9] CHG (2008). Plan Especial del Alto Guadiana. Ministerio de Medio Ambiente. Guadiana
CHG. Available online at: http://www.chguadiana.es/ (January, 2008).
[10] Crase, L. and OKeefe, S. (2009). The Paradox of National Water Savings, Agenda, 16
(1): 45-60.
[11] Foerster, A. (2011), Developing Purposeful and Adaptive Institutions for E¤ective En-
vironmental Water Governance, Water Resources Management, 25: 40054018.
[12] Freeman, R. (2005). CanWater Allocation Buy-back Schemes be Equitable for Impacted
Communities?, OECD Workshop on Agriculture and Water: Sustainability, Markets
and Policies, Adelaide, South Australia, 14-18 November 2005.
[13] Garrido, A., Martinez-Santos, P., and Llamas, M. R. (2006). Groundwater Irrigation
and its Implications for Water Policy in Semiarid Countries: the Spanish Experience,
Hydrogeology Journal, 14: 340-349.
[14] Gisser, M. and Sanchez, D. A. (1980). Competition vs. Optimal Control in Groundwater
Pumping, Water Resources Research, 16: 638-642.
33
This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Water Resources Management. 
The final authenticated version is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11269-012-0047-8
[15] Heyes, A. G. (2000). Making Things Stick: Enforcement and Compliance, in D. Helm
(ed), Environmental Policy: Objectives, Instruments, and Implementation, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 91-110.
[16] Kemper, K. E. (2000). Groundwater Management in Mexico: Legal and Institutional
Issues, in Salman M. A. Salman (ed), Groundwater Legal and Policy Perspectives, The
World Bank, Washington D.C., 117-124.
[17]  . (2007). Instruments and Institutions for Groundwater Management, in M. Giordano
and K. G. Villholth (eds.), The Agricultural Groundwater Revolution: Opportunities and
Threats to Development, CAB International Publisher, 153-172.
[18] Llamas, M. R. (2005), Research and Action Plan: Guadiana Basin, NeWater Project
- New Approaches to Adaptive Water Management under Uncertainty, Report D 3.4.1.
[19] Lopez-Gunn, E. (2003). The Role of Collective Action in Water Governance: A Com-
parative Study of Groundwater User Associations in La Mancha Aquifers, Spain,Water
International, 28(3): 367-378.
[20] Marchiori, C., Stratton Sayre, S., and Simon, L. (2012), Bargaining and Devolution in
the Upper Guadiana Basin, Environmental and Resource Economics, 51 (3): 453-470.
[21] Martinez-Santos, P., Llamas, M. R., and Martinez-Alfaro, P.E. (2008), Vulnerability
Assessment of Groundwater Resources; A Modelling-based Approach to the Mancha
Occidental Aquifer, Spain, Environmental Modelling & Software, 23: 1145-1162.
34
This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Water Resources Management. 
The final authenticated version is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11269-012-0047-8
[22] Melville, F. and Broughton, P. (2004). Trading in Water Rights, Water and the Aus-
tralian Economy, Growth, 52, Committee for Economic Development of Australia, Mel-
bourne.
[23] Meritxell, C., Font, N., Rigol, A., and Subirats, J. (2004). The Evolution of Water
Regime in Spain, in I. Kissling and S. Kuks (eds.), The Evolution of National Water
Regimes in Europe, Kluwer Academic Publishers, The Netherlands, 235-263.
[24] Moench, M. (2003). Goundwater and Poverty: Exploring the Connections, in M. R.
Llamas and E. Custodio (eds.), Intensive Use of Groundwater. Challenges and Oppor-
tunities, Balkema Publishers, The Netherlands, 441-456.
[25] Nevill, C. J. (2009), Managing Cumulative Impacts: Groundwater Reform in the
Murray-Darling Basin, Australia, Water Resources Management, 23: 26052631.
[26] Stoneham, G., Chaudhri, V., Ha, A., and Strappazzon, L. (2002). Auctions for Con-
servation Contracts: An Empirical Examination of Victorias BushTender Trial, 46th
Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Conference, Canberra, Aus-
tralia, 13-15 February 2002.
[27] Stratton, S. E., Simon, L. K., and Marchiori, C. (2008). Promoting Groundwater Re-
form in the Guadiana Basin, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 90 (5):
13431349.
35
This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Water Resources Management. 
The final authenticated version is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11269-012-0047-8
[28] Thoyer, S. (2006). How to Reallocate Water Rights when Environmental Goals Conict
with Existing Entilements, International Journal of Sustainable Development, 9(2):
122-136.
[29] UN (2003), Water for People, Water for Life, UNESCO-WWAP, Paris, France.
[30] Varela-Ortega, C. (2007), Policy-driven Determinants of Irrigation Development and
Environmental Sustainability: A Case Study in Spain, in Molle, F. and Berko¤, J.
(eds.), Irrigation Water Pricing Policy in Context: Exploring the Gap between The-
ory and Practice, Comprehensive Assessment of Water Management in Agriculture,
IWMI/CABI, Wallingford UK and Cambridge MA, USA, 328-346.
[31] Wong, P. (2008), Water Purchase Expands to Southern Basin: Press Release by Com-
monwealth Minister for Climate Change and Water, 26 September 2008, DEWHA.
[32] World Bank (2005). Pakistan Country Water Resources Assistance Strategy. Pakistans
Water Economy: Running Dry, Washington, DC.
36
This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Water Resources Management. 
The final authenticated version is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11269-012-0047-8
